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THE SHARING ECONOMY AS AN
EQUALIZING ECONOMY
John O. McGinnis*
Economic equality is often said to be the key problem of our time. But information technology dematerializes the world in ways that are helpful to the ninety-nine percent, because information can be shared. This Article looks at how one fruit of the information revolution—the
sharing economy—has important equalizing features on both its supply and demand sides.
First, on the supply side, the intermediaries in the sharing economy, like Airbnb and Uber, allow
owners of housing and cars to monetize their most important capital assets. The gig aspect of this
economy creates spot markets in jobs that have flexible hours and monetizes people’s passions,
such as cooking meals in their home. Such benefits make these jobs even more valuable than the
earnings that show up imperfectly in income statistics. The law and economics analysis of Hernando de Soto has shown how creating property rights and more formal markets can help those of
modest means in the developing world. The sharing economy performs a similar function for
people of modest means in the developed world.
Second, on the demand side, the sharing economy also creates gains for consumers that
largely go to the ninety-nine percent. Airbnb finds them cheaper accommodations in places that
may have been unaffordable. But the advantages go beyond price. Summoning a ridesharing
car almost anywhere with the press of a smartphone is a much closer approximation of having a
chauffeur—a hallmark of wealth—than hailing a taxi. The law and economics analysis of
Ronald Coase shows how replacing such physical agents with online agents redounds largely to
the benefit of those with modest incomes.
If the sharing economy has equalizing as well as efficiency features, regulations must be
careful not to disturb them. But because the sharing economy permits new entry into markets,
incumbents will respond with new regulatory efforts to hamper it. This Article provides a taxonomy of the different kinds of regulation to help preserve the equalizing features from being
impaired.
The Article ends by showing how the sharing economy more generally problematizes the
conventional story of growing material inequality. The dematerialization of the world provides
greater opportunities for broadly shared consumption, like that on Facebook, and improves working conditions, particularly for the middling classes. Only by taking account of these trends can
we understand the changing relative material conditions of people.
© 2018 John O. McGinnis. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* George C. Dix Professor in Constitutional Law, Northwestern University Pritzker
School of Law. Thanks to Colin Monaghan and Christian Riess for excellent research
assistance and for comments from Alex Lee, Nelson Lund, Mark Perry, Jim Speta, and
participants at a Northwestern faculty workshop.
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INTRODUCTION
Today many claim that economic inequality is the most pressing social
problem of our time.1 But that contention sits uneasily with the rise and
ubiquity of information technology that gives the middling classes more
equal consumption of many things to which the rich have long had easy and
excellent access. Information itself is one example. In years past, the rich
had large private libraries and even librarians. Today most of the world’s
knowledge is available to be shared on the internet.
Beyond specific examples, basic economic principles show that an information society necessarily has important equalizing aspects. The most salient
trend of our world is the way it is dematerializing. Information technology is
making distance and material things relatively less salient. And since material things are scarce and often cannot be consumed jointly, but immaterial
things, like information and virtual reality, are easily shared and can be consumed by everyone at once, consumption becomes more broadly distributed.
This Article considers how one transformation driven by the rise of
information technology and computation—the sharing or gig economy—
provides an example of an equalizer in our world. The sharing economy
provides equalizing benefits on the both the supply and demand sides. On
the supply side, its dematerializing qualities make possible markets in prop1 As articulated by politicians and social theorists alike. See Neil H. Buchanan, Yes, the
Political and Economic Issue of Our Time Really Is Inequality, VERDICT (Sept. 21, 2017), https://
verdict.justia.com/2017/09/21/yes-political-economic-issue-time-really-inequality; Richard
McGregor, Inequality Is ‘Defining Issue of Our Time,’ Says Obama, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2013),
https://www.ft.com/content/0cf55624-5d0f-11e3-a558-00144feabdc0 (quoting Barack
Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President on Economic Mobility (Dec. 4,
2013)).
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erty and human capital, in which the middling classes possess a disproportionate share of their assets. On the demand side, it creates online agents
that give middling classes opportunities for consumption once available only
to the rich.
On the supply side, these markets particularly redound to the benefit of
the nonrich, because they hold wealth predominantly in those kinds of assets
rather than the securities and businesses that the rich disproportionately
hold. As a result of the rise of the sharing economy, for instance, a homeowner or a car owner can generate income from his home or car through
Airbnb and Uber.
The gig aspect of the sharing economy also creates new kinds of opportunities for supply by creating spot markets for jobs, like driving a car for hire
or cooking, that are accessible to people with modest skills. These jobs also
have amenities like flexible hours, which the rich have long enjoyed and
which economists have shown are so much in demand that they can
represent as much value as a substantial portion of the wage earned.
On the demand side, the dematerialization of the world reduces search
and contracting costs, allowing online agents to be substituted for physical
agents. Thus, instead of standing out in the street to hail a cab with the
uncertainty of finding one, Uber gives much greater assurance of having a
car at your door within minutes. One of the defining aspects of being rich
previously was having agents to avoid hassles, but online agents today provide
close substitutes. Having an Uber app on one’s smartphone is a lot closer to
having a chauffeur—a service only the rich once enjoyed.
Law and economics illuminate not only the efficiencies of the sharing
economy but also these equalizing effects. On the supply side, a great law
and economics theorist of the developing world, Hernado de Soto, showed
that poor people stayed poor in no small part because they did not have
property rights in their homes and other assets that they controlled.2 As a
result, they had difficulty generating income from the property in the form
of a mortgage, or accumulating family capital by bequeathing their property
to relatives.3 De Soto argued that this was a substantial source of inequality.4
While the middle class in the developed world has long enjoyed formal
property rights, information technology allows people to make effective divi2 See Hernando de Soto, Excerpts From The Mystery of Capital, 6 BRIGHAM-KANNER
PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 9, 13 (2017) (noting that the poor in undeveloped countries “hold
[their] resources in defective forms: houses built on land whose ownership rights are not
adequately recorded, unincorporated businesses with undefined liability, industries
located where financiers and investors cannot see them”).
3 See id. (“Because the rights to these possessions are not adequately documented,
these assets cannot readily be turned into capital, cannot be traded outside of narrow local
circles where people know and trust each other, cannot be used as collateral for a loan,
and cannot be used as a share against an investment.”).
4 See id. at 15 (noting that societies that participate in capitalism without capital are
marked by inequality).
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sions within them that can be sheared off and pooled to generate income.5
It does so with real property, like homes; personal property, like cars; and
human capital, like the capacity to cook excellent meals. Thus, it enlivens
their capital, just as formal rights enliven the capital of the less well-off in the
developing world.6
Given that taxation has not caught up with these sources of income, they
are imperfectly measured in government income statistics. Moreover, for the
mass of people who have little or no income beyond their salary, this income
is worth more than additional salary income dollar for dollar, because it
diversifies sources of income and protects against life’s risks. Thus, if hours
on regular jobs are cut back, or one gets sick, another source of income is
available to fall back on.
Relevant to the demand side, Ronald Coase showed the centrality of
transaction costs, including search costs, to the economy.7 Sometimes the
costs of transactions are so high that the transactions cannot occur.8 Examples of such transactions include many short-term room rentals and car hires.
But information technology has sharply reduced such transaction costs.9
And that has also redounded to the advantage of the middling classes. The
rich could bring agents into their household even for transactions that were
hard to get on the market, like reliable on-time drivers. Their help could
find places to stay and guides that perfectly match their peculiar interests.
But now these services are broadly available online.
The law and economics of the equalizing aspects of the sharing economy
also show that regulations of this economy must be careful not to undermine
its equalizing features. For instance, forcing Uber drivers to be employees
with regular hours would harm both middling workers and consumers. It
would make it harder for the workers to have the completely flexible hours
that are valuable to them. And it would make it more difficult for the supply
of cars to match the needs of passengers and give them reliable, real-time
service, because this supply varies widely depending on time, weather, and
events that are impossible to predict in advance. While some regulation is
compatible with preserving equalizing features, there has been far too little
attention to these dangers to equality.
5 See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, Essay, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and
Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1641 (2017) (“The sharing economy promises to unlock
various resources with excess capacity, such as a household’s guestroom.”).
6 Where Does the Wealthy Investor Place Their Money?, SPECTREMGROUP, https://spectrem
.com/Content/wealthy-investors-portfolio.aspx (last visited Dec. 22, 2017) (noting that
high net worth individuals store their wealth primarily in investable assets, compared with
sixteen percent of wealth held in a principal residence).
7 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 10 (1960) (“With costless
market transactions, the decision of the courts concerning liability for damage would be
without effect on the allocation of resources.”).
8 Id. at 15.
9 See Vanessa Katz, Note, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1067,
1075 (2015) (noting that the sharing economy has decreased transaction costs through
“decreas[ing] the information cost of determining whether a provider is trustworthy”).
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This Article proceeds in five Parts. First, it briefly uses Airbnb as an
example of the sharing economy, emphasizing its equalizing features. Second, it shows how to categorize and understand these equalizing features in
terms of the law and economics theories of de Soto and Coase. Third, it
responds to possible critiques of the equalizing thesis, such as the concern
that the sharing economy makes its investors rich and has put some employees out of work. Fourth, it provides a taxonomy of the regulations proposed
for the sharing economy—regulations that variously protect incumbents, prevent regulatory arbitrage, and address what are perceived to be new problems
created by the sharing economy. It then suggests that focusing on the equality-creating features of the sharing economy helps determine which of these
regulations are beneficial.
Finally, it argues that the sharing economy provides a window into the
wider range of equalizers of the modern information economy. Even when
we consider only income as a measure of equality, some new and growing
sources of income may be hard to measure in government statistics, like
much of that from the sharing economy, because technology is changing
work structure so much that taxation has trouble keeping up. But even more
importantly, technology is creating better nonmonetary conditions for jobs
of average income workers, like flexibility and safety, that are also a part of
the material condition of employment and of life. Finally, technology is creating aspects of consumption that redound particularly to the broad middle
of society, like the ability to summon a quality ride wherever and whenever
needed and to have fast access to information—benefits that were once
largely the province of the rich. Only by accounting for such matters can one
come to a fair assessment of whether equality of material condition is increasing or declining.
It should be noted that this Article does not argue that the sharing economy tempers the problem of poverty, although aspects of it may help some
poor people. Inequality must be contrasted with poverty, both conceptually
and empirically.10 Poverty concerns the inability to meet basic needs and can
be defined absolutely once the basic needs of society are determined. It also
often involves various incapacities that prevent people from working at all.
Inequality concerns the relative position of the rich and less well-off and thus
is a distinct issue.
I. AN INTRODUCTION

TO THE

SHARING ECONOMY

The sharing or gig economy provides an excellent example of how technology can both increase economic efficiency, and narrow the difference in
material living experiences of the middle class and the rich. It does both by
creating more liquid markets in more kinds of assets, unlocking the incomegenerating potential of the property that middle-income groups own, and
the skills that millions have. It also creates online agents, making possible
10 See generally Andre Beteille, Poverty and Inequality, 38 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 4455
(2003).
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bargains that rich people with their paid physical agents could already strike.
It gives greater flexibility and autonomy to middle-income groups that many
higher-income professionals already enjoy.
The growing and vibrant sharing economy is a child of computation and
the internet.11 It combines our greater connectivity and calculating power to
facilitate transactions that would have been impossible even ten years ago.12
Thus, it shows how the dematerialization of the world through the power of
information processing can be an equalizer among all of those who have the
discipline and skills to use it.
The essence of the sharing economy is that it uses online agency to create markets in property and jobs that were not nearly as effective previously.
As a result, people, particularly those of modest means, can more easily enter
markets with a new supply.13 The online agency aspects of the sharing economy reduce search, information, and agency costs, making available better
and cheaper services and products for those who demand it.14
Take Airbnb, the company that helps bring property owners and shortterm renters together.15 A classic intermediary earning revenue from both
guests and hosts, it uses an internet platform that allows owners of houses
and condominiums to advertise and rent out rooms, apartments, or houses
to travelers they have never met through a website maintained by the
company.16
To be sure, people have been renting out their houses or rooms for a
long time. But the information technology provided by Airbnb makes the
transactions much easier and more attractive for both property owners and
renters. The owners get to advertise to a much larger potential pool of renters because people from all over can inspect their properties online, and
potential renters get to inspect a larger pool of properties. The owners get
standard form legal contracts and insurance against damage to their property.17 As a result, they can rent out their homes for stays of much shorter
durations and with much greater confidence that they will find guests.
Being able to rent out your property at short notice and for both short
and longer durations enhances economic well-being by providing a stream of
11 See Elia Brugnoni et al., Innovation and Governance: The Role of Sharing Economy, in
ICT FOR PROMOTING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 195 (Francisco J. Mata & Ana Pont, eds., 2016) https://files.ifi.uzh.ch/hilty/t/Literature_by_RQs/
RQ%20305/2016_Brugnoni_Polzonetti_Sagratella_Innovation_and_Governance.pdf
(arguing that the sharing economy is a consequence of Moore’s law and the internet).
12 See Martin Kenney & John Zysman, The Rise of the Platform Economy, ISSUES SCI. &
TECH., Spring 2016, at 61, 61.
13 See Christopher Koopman et al., The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 540 (2015).
14 See infra Section II.B.
15 See Georgios Zervas et al., The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of
Airbnb on the Hotel Industry, 54 J. MARKETING RES. 687, 689 (2017).
16 See id.
17 See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
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income.18 Some property owners will use the rental income to do more
travelling themselves. More leisure for travel is a historical marker of being
rich. And the increased travel creates even more demand for Airbnb rentals.
The renter, in turn, gets an expanded selection of rental properties that
can be rented with little notice. By providing cheaper accommodations,
Airbnb helps travelers stay in places they could not have afforded or lets
them live more comfortably than they could have with friends or family. And
even for those travelers who could afford a hotel, settling in someone’s home
often provides a richer and more distinctive experience of a particular location. A shingle house evokes New England’s past. The Pueblo style summons up the history of the Southwest. And the uniqueness of an individual’s
home contrasts with standard hotel accommodations that look more and
more the same everywhere. Airbnb’s slogan, “Belong Anywhere,” captures
both the reach of its operations and the personal touch of living in someone’s house.19 The rich have long been able to enjoy such distinctive
experiences.
Airbnb’s online agency permits both the host and the guest to gain confidence in one another because travelers rate the host and their rental
properties and the host rates the travelers—what the CEO of Airbnb calls a
“design[ ] for trust.”20 Renting a room in a house before the advent of
Airbnb often seemed a risky proposition, because the owner might turn out
to be a criminal, including a sexual harasser. The rating system reduces the
possibility of dreadful results. It helps assure hosts that the guest will treat
their properties with respect and makes the traveler expect that the property
will live up to its specifications. This new system is also a direct result of the
dematerialization of the world. Word of mouth—the phenomenon that a
rating system perfects—is a term that itself reflects the more laborious physical origins of distributing information.21
This use of such information technology is more of a boon to those of
modest means than the rich. First, consider the property owners. For most
people of moderate means, real property is their greatest asset.22 Airbnb
18 See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 5, at 1644 (“Airbnb takes the stance that the
income people earn through its platform allows them to afford their rent.”).
19 See Brian Chesky, Belong Anywhere, AIRBNB: BLOG (July 16, 2014), https://blog.atair
bnb.com/belong-anywhere/ (“You see, a house is just a space, but a home is where you
belong. And what makes this global community so special is that for the very first time, you
can belong anywhere.” (emphasis added)).
20 Charlie Aufmann, Designing for Trust: Observations From My First Year at Airbnb,
AIRBNB, https://airbnb.design/designing-for-trust/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2018).
21 See Zachary Crockett, How the Sharing Economy Makes Us Trust Complete Strangers, HUSTLE (Apr. 14, 2018), https://thehustle.co/sharing-economy-trust (“Arun Sundararajan,
author of ‘The Sharing Economy,’ tells us these technologies have essentially ‘expedited’
the process of gaining trust.”).
22 See The 2016 Survey of Consumer Finance, FED. RES., tbls. 8 & 9 https://www.federalre
serve.gov/econres/files/scf2016_tables_public_real_historical.xlsx (last updated Nov. 15,
2017).
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allows them to monetize their property and turn it into a stream of income.23
According to data provided by Airbnb, the typical host who rents out a single
property makes $7530 a year—no small sum, and about fourteen percent of
the median income.24 And most of Airbnb’s hosts are not rich.25 This kind
of income provides an additional advantage: it is independent of employment and thus represents a kind of diversification in sources of income.26
In contrast, higher-income people generally have their wealth invested
in traditional financial assets that diversify their income beyond that gained
by employment. And those rich people who do rent out their grand properties are well-placed to demand security deposits that assure that their property will be treated well. Airbnb uses the internet to allow average people to
monetize their property, generate income, and democratize the kind of trust
and confidence that before was available only to higher-income groups.27
Next, consider the travelers and how they benefit from Airbnb. For
those of modest means, Airbnb provides a low-cost place to stay at prices that
are often $50 to $100 cheaper per night compared to a hotel.28 In contrast,
higher-income groups can easily afford hotels when they travel and do not
need to search for low-cost accommodations. And for those travelers who
value a more personal experience when vacationing, Airbnb can provide a
richer and more diverse experience of the place they are visiting than a
hotel. The rich can already choose some of the most historically distinctive
lodgings of the world, like the Waldorf Astoria in New York City or the Statler
Hilton off the Spanish Steps in Rome. Thanks to the new entrepreneurial
sharing economy, affordable Airbnb rentals are often not so distant from
high-end luxury hotels in such cities.
II. THE LAW

AND

ECONOMICS OF THE EQUALIZING FEATURES
SHARING ECONOMY

OF THE

It is not a contingent fact about the world that this new economy
improves the lot of the bottom ninety-nine percent more than the top one
percent or even the top ten percent. Instead, it is the equalizing effect of the
new information technologies. The new collaborative platforms benefit average households as owners, because the peer marketplaces create more liquid
23 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
24 See GENE SPERLING, How Airbnb Combats Middle Class Income Stagnation 8 (2015),
https://www.stgeorgeutah.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/MiddleClassReport-MT-06
1915_r1.pdf.
25 In Los Angeles, for instance, the median income of an Airbnb host is $49,241 and in
New York it is $53,058. Id. at 11. Even in San Francisco it is $78,724. Id.
26 See RACHEL S. SIEGEL & CAROL YACHT, INDIVIDUAL FINANCE 63–64 (2012).
27 See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 5, at 1623 (noting how economic value is provided
by “[s]haring economy firms such as Uber and Airbnb [who] facilitate trusted transactions
between strangers on digital platforms”).
28 See Talia Avakian, Here’s Where It’s Cheaper to Book an Airbnb Over a Hotel Room, BUS.
INSIDER (Feb 18, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/is-it-cheaper-to-airbnb-or-get-ahotel-2016-2.
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markets in new areas where a large swath of the population, not just the rich,
can monetize their capital and generate income.
Technology also helps the middle class as consumers because it creates
online agents to connect consumers to products and services in real time.
The rich already have agents of their own—like private secretaries, maids,
landscapers, chauffeurs, and cooks. The reduction of agency costs in the
form of rating systems also benefits both producers and consumers by reducing monitoring and search costs for services—costs that the rich have had
agents to address.
A.

De Soto and Enlivening Capital

The ideas of two famous law and economics scholars illuminate how creating markets in more kinds of real and personal property, through virtual
assistance, helps both the earnings and consumption of the middle class. A
native of Peru, Hernando de Soto recognized that much of the capital in
developing nations was locked up in the informal economy.29 Importantly,
for instance, squatters lacked property rights in their houses even after
decades of living there and improving the land.30
As a result, many people’s most important capital asset—their home—
was inert or, as de Soto put it, “dead.”31 For example, the lack of legal title
means that real property cannot be pledged to support a mortgage, to start a
small business, or to pay for private education. Property could often not be
easily sold or rented, because the squatter had no formal rights with which to
contract.32 Thus, because of poor legal institutions and a lack of property
rights, lower-income groups in the developing world remained impoverished
for generations, because they were not able to access their “dead capital”33 as
a path toward a better life.34
Prompted by de Soto’s ideas, many nations around the world have
improved their legal systems for recording property and giving legal title to
29 See de Soto, supra note 2, at 13 (noting that poor countries have vast significant
amounts of wealth that cannot be leveraged “outside of narrow local circles where people
know and trust each other”).
30 See id. at 31 (noting how the “integrated property market,” which was gradually
created in the United States as Congress formalized the “property rules created by millions
of immigrants and squatters,” helped “fuel[ ] the United States’ explosive economic
growth”).
31 Id. at 13.
32 Id. at 55 (noting how “legal apartheid” constrains the poor in developing countries
to real estate transactions “restricted to closed circles of trading partners, keeping the
assets of extralegal owners outside the expanded market”). For discussion of how insurance contracts by an intermediary solve agency problems, see Thomas A. Weber, Intermediation in a Sharing Economy: Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Rent Extraction, J. MGMT. INFO. SYS.,
Winter 2014, at 35, 37. For Airbnb’s offer of insurance, see Host Protection Insurance,
AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/host-protection-insurance (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
33 De Soto, supra note 2, at 13.
34 See id. at 55 (“Blocked from entering the bell jar, the poor could never get close to
the legal property mechanisms necessary to generate capital.”).
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people who converted abandoned property into homes.35 These legal
reforms have greatly enlivened the real property in those nations.36 When a
squatter becomes a property owner, he has more capital than he previously
enjoyed and greater capacity to put that capital to productive use, as with a
mortgage. The advantages of these legal reforms affecting real property go
almost entirely to people of modest means. Not only did the rich generally
always have formal title to their real property, that property is a much smaller
proportion of their total assets, which are mostly invested in the form of
financial securities (e.g., stocks and bonds) and other forms of legally protected assets.
Similarly, the sharing economy enlivens capital in the developed world,
and it also focuses on the kind of capital to which people of modest means
have access. Even in the United States, where the vast majority of people
have formal title to their real and personal property, their property often lies
fallow when it could be earning money.37 When a homeowner is away on
vacation, he can legally rent his home for a short time. He also can rent out
a spare bedroom or a suite over a garage when his children are away at college. But the practical obstacles to do so for a reasonable price were previously prohibitively large.38 That is where Airbnb’s service makes the
difference, by giving a homeowner access to a global pool of potential renters, and by creating an off-the-shelf contract and insurance to facilitate making the rental transaction as easy as possible from a legal standpoint.
Just as in the developing world, the benefits of enlivening and monetizing the capital in people’s homes that would otherwise be dormant redounds
more to the middle class than the rich because real property is a greater
proportion of their total assets and net worth than it is for the wealthy. For
most average nonwealthy people, their home is their largest asset.39 In contrast, for higher-income households, their homes are a much smaller proportion of their total net worth.40 Because of the relative insignificance of the
value of their homes to their total assets, upper-class Americans are less likely
to be interested in renting out their real estate in the first place.
The sharing economy enlivens all kinds of property, even beyond the
most familiar example of Airbnb. For example, the website Spacer allows you
to rent out extra space in your home or garage for storage.41 There are also
35 See Breathing Life into Dead Capital, ECONOMIST (Jan. 15, 2004), http://www.econo
mist.com/node/2328596.
36 Id.
37 See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
38 See Katz, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
39 Jacob Goldstein, A Lost Decade for American Families, NPR: PLANET MONEY (June 11,
2012), http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2012/06/11/154782513/a-lost-decade-foramerican-families.
40 Compare Where Does the Wealthy Investor Place Their Money?, supra note 6 (noting that
high net worth individuals store their wealth primarily in investable assets, compared with
sixteen percent of wealth held in a principal residence), with Goldstein, supra note 39
(noting homes are the single largest asset for many middle-class families).
41 SPACER, https://www.spacer.com/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
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peer-to-peer web platforms that do for personal property what Airbnb does
for real property. For example, Turo is a website that helps arrange peer-topeer car rentals so that car owners can rent their vehicles to individuals when
those vehicles would otherwise sit idle.42 Peer-to-peer rental and sharing
platforms like Spinlister do the same for bikes.43 You can now offer your
bike for rent anywhere in the world.44
More famously, app-based platforms like Lyft and Uber allow car owners
to monetize their personal vehicles when they become drivers for the
ridesharing companies and pick up passengers.45 The ridesharing business
model enlivens capital in automobiles—another big-ticket capital asset for
most people.
But ridesharing also enlivens another wholly different kind of capital—
human capital—because an owner’s return from turning his or her vehicle
into a taxi comes not just from the return on the financial capital invested in
their car, but also from the money earned from the ridesharing services.46
This part of the sharing economy is less commented upon, but it may turn
out to be even more important because of the variety of human capital for
which markets are not practically available.
As with real and personal property, the problem was that without the
internet it was difficult to make a market in different kinds of human capital,
particularly where employed in short-term jobs.47 Those who wanted to hire
people for short-term and part-time jobs did not have nearly as good a way to
find a pool of willing applicants.48 And those who wanted to work in this
42 TURO, https://turo.com/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
43 SPINLISTER, https://www.spinlister.com/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
44 Natasha Baker, Spinlister App Connects Bike Owners with Renters, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/05/spinlister_n_3706373.html;
Kirsten Korosec, The Airbnb of Cars Just Bought a Startup From Its Newest Investor, FORTUNE
(Sept. 6, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/turo-mercedes-daimler/.
45 LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2018); UBER, https://www.uber
.com/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
46 See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 5, at 1641 (noting that the sharing economy
unlocks money-making potential in people’s time by “provid[ing] more and more diverse
opportunities to make money,” allowing those whose schedules are not conducive to normal jobs to still earn money).
47 See id. at 1642 (first citing Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark, Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber’s Drivers, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 3758, 3761 (2016); then
citing Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s DriverPartners in the United States 11–12, 16 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working
Paper No. 587, 2015), http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp010z708z67d) (noting
that the nature of the sharing economy allows workers the freedom to switch fluidly
between jobs, benefiting those who require short-term or temporary jobs for whatever
reason)).
48 See Hall & Krueger, supra note 47, at 1 (noting that Uber’s “flexibility is appealing to
driver-partners,” as they “can choose to pursue other work opportunities or spend time
taking care of non-work obligations” even while they remain eligible on Uber’s platform).
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area did not have nearly as much access to a pool of employers.49 Just as
information technology allows people to segment their personal and real
property in a way that makes it more saleable, information technology has
the same effect on human capital.
Some of these companies specialize in human capital markets for very
specific purposes. Rover, for instance, facilitates dog sitting.50 Others are
more general, like Thumbtack,51 Fiverr,52 and TaskRabbit,53 which are peerto-peer platforms that connect those who are willing to be hired to perform a
variety of services with those who are willing to pay somebody to do those
services. For example, using Fiverr, you can hire freelancers to perform services including logo design, illustrations, web design, infographics, business
copywriting, translation, animation, legal consulting, financial consulting,
and birthday greetings.54
Airbnb is now enlivening human capital as well as real property by
extending its peer-to-peer platform to include the opportunity for travelers in
unfamiliar locations to make arrangements to meet with “hosts” through the
new service called “Experiences.”55 For instance, if you are a local expert on
the history of the Civil War and the geography of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania,
the Airbnb platform can connect you to those travelers who want a private
tour of the battlefield.56
The websites BonAppetour57 and Eatwith58 similarly connect those who
have a passion for cooking with travelers who want the experience of a homecooked meal in a new city. Some people are great cooks, while most lack the
ability to make a soufflé. But most such cooks never get the opportunity to
cook for anyone besides their friends and family. With BonAppetour and
Eatwith, passionate cooks who enjoying entertaining can now host travelers
from all over the world in their homes and monetize their homes and cooking skills.
Thus, the peer-to-peer sharing economy allows people to more easily
make money from their vocations or avocations and generate income in ways
that were never possible before. The wealthy already have high-paying jobs
and enough assets and net worth that make raising their incomes less important. Moreover, many high-income individuals have reputations, like well49 See id. at 10 (“The fact that over one-third of driver-partners partnered with Uber
without actively searching for a job suggests that Uber provided a new alternative that
enticed a large number of people to engage in work activity that was not previously
available.”).
50 ROVER, https://www.rover.com/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
51 THUMBTACK, https://www.thumbtack.com/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
52 FIVERR, https://www.fiverr.com/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
53 TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
54 See FIVERR, supra note 52.
55 Host an Experience on Airbnb, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/host/experiences?
from_nav=1 (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
56 Id.
57 BONAPPETOUR, https://www.bonappetour.com/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
58 EATWITH, https://www.eatwith.com/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
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known lawyers, that are self-advertising and need no pooling market for their
services. These peer-to-peer services primarily help those of more modest
means.
And these jobs generate not only income but also personal satisfaction
that other jobs do not. Just as most college professors get a lot of personal
job satisfaction beyond their financial compensation because they are able to
teach and write about their favorite topics, the same is true with chefs and
night club guides.59 They are being paid for what they love to do.60
The formal law and economic perspective on this benefit comes from
the analysis of compensating differentials.61 An unpleasant job has to offer
people a wage premium to be equivalent to jobs requiring the same skills. In
contrast, a gratifying job leads people to accept lower wages.62 For example,
a coal miner is paid more than other jobs requiring equivalent skills because
the job is both unpleasant and dangerous.63 It follows directly that the more
utility one gets from a job outside compensation, the less compensation will
be required, holding skills equal.
Thus, it is important to note that significant gains from the sharing economy in human capital come in the form of nonmonetary compensation that
does not show up in income statistics at all. For most of human history, most
people have not enjoyed the jobs they have, because they are burdensome or
even dangerous. The rich have often been an exception to the reality that
work involves unpleasant toil. Being a captain of industry allows a chief executive scope for creativity and command that most find pleasurable. As the
sharing economy allows people to profitably pursue their passions, they are
improving their life satisfaction and thus equalizing human happiness.
Moreover, even besides opportunities to combine passions and vocations, the gig economy and peer marketplace have other characteristics, like
autonomy and flexibility, that increase the value of those jobs beyond the
wages received. For example, a freelance job for an illustrator through a
website like Fiverr or TaskRabbit can be completed according to a timeframe
that works for both the buyer and seller. As discussed below, flexibility can
59 See LOUIS PUTTERMAN, THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE ECONOMY: DOES HUMAN
NATURE RULE OUT A BETTER WORLD? 69 (2012) (noting that professors are paid less
because of the autonomy and other satisfactions they enjoy).
60 See Leonard A. Schlesinger et al., Choosing Between Making Money and Doing What You
Love, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 29, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/03/choosing-between-making-money.
61 See, e.g., Peter F. Kostiuk, Compensating Differentials for Shift Work, 98 J. POL. ECON.
1054, 1054 (1990).
62 See Tom Lehman, Countering the Modern Luddite Impulse, 20 INDEP. REV. 265, 270–71
(2015) (noting “lower monetary earnings to those workers employed in more-attractive
occupations” like a professor or family doctor, as opposed to more stressful occupations,
like emergency room physician).
63 See Devin Dwyer, Craving Coal Dust ‘Like Nicotine’: Why Miners Love the Work, ABC
NEWS (Apr. 7, 2010), https://abcnews.go.com/US/Mine/west-virginia-coal-miners-alluredangerous-profession/story?id=10305839 (explaining that the dangerous profession of
coal mining includes a high starting salary).
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be worth forty percent more than actual wages earned compared to a job
with inflexible hours.64 This is not surprising; temporal flexibility allows one
to take care of family responsibilities as needed. Geographic flexibility allows
one to avoid long commutes. This kind of autonomy and flexibility is usually
only enjoyed by those who are very well-off—like tenured professors or many
of the rich.
Furthermore, that same flexibility allows people to work part-time. Parttime work can be worth more per hour to people than full-time work if they
only want to work part-time. It is valuable because working only for a portion
of the day at hours of one’s choosing allows ample time to take care of families, pursue a career as a writer, actor, or artist, or take care of chronic medical conditions.65
One study found that this flexibility is a significant incentive for individuals who choose to drive part-time for Uber: eighty-seven percent expressed a
desire “to be my own boss and set my own schedule,” eighty-five percent
wanted “to have more flexibility in my schedule and balance my work with my
life and family,” and seventy-four percent wanted “to help maintain a steady
income because other sources of income are unstable/unpredictable.”66
Thus, the information connectivity that is the hallmark of the sharing
economy makes key nonmonetary aspects of job more like the jobs that the
well-off have traditionally had. These aspects of converging nonmonetary
compensations represent gains for equality.
B.

Coase and the Reduction of Agency Costs

Another law and economics scholar, Ronald Coase, showed how the
costs of engaging in market transactions are an important part of economic
life. These costs of using the market come at every stage of a transaction.
Each of these costs is so important that economists give them a name: the
costs of finding someone with whom to deal are “search costs.”67 The costs
of writing the agreement are “contract costs.”68 And the costs of making sure
that the contract is performed are “monitoring costs.”69 Sometimes these
costs, collectively called “transaction costs,” can be so prohibitively high that
they can prevent otherwise mutually beneficial deals from taking place.70
64 See infra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
65 Most part-time workers want to work only part-time for these reasons. See BARRY
HIRSCH, EMPL’T POLICIES INST., THE RELATIVE COMPENSATION OF PART-TIME AND FULL-TIME
WORKERS 4 (2000), https://www.epionline.org/studies/r17/.
66 Hall & Krueger, supra note 47, at 11.
67 See P.K. RAO, THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSACTION COSTS xvi (2003).
68 See id.
69 See id.
70 Coase, supra note 7, at 15 (“[Transaction costs] are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world
in which the pricing system worked without cost.”).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-1\NDL107.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 15

19-NOV-18

the sharing economy as an equalizing economy

13:05

343

Coase pointed out that one result of high transaction costs is that large
corporations have many agents on the payroll.71 It makes economic sense to
perform many services internally when transaction costs with outside contractors or suppliers are high.72 For instance, if the company employs someone
full-time to look for merger partners, it does not have to contract with an
investment bank to perform those services. Of course, there are costs to performing tasks internally that include the compensation expenses of hiring
full-time employees. We often speak of corporate bureaucracy, because a
large corporation sometimes resembles the inefficiency of a government
bureaucracy in terms of generating a lot of paperwork and relying on administrative orders rather than the market.73 Nevertheless, corporations exist
because often these costs of internal production are less than the transaction
costs of using the market for individual contracts.74
Similarly, one of the defining features of being rich through the ages has
been employing people within the household to avoid the transaction costs
of using the market. For instance, it is often hard to be sure of obtaining
instant and reliable transportation by relying on a spot market for transportation. But by hiring a chauffeur, the rich could enjoy quality on-demand
transportation services.
The sharing economy reduces transactions costs at every stage. First, the
peer economy makes it easier for providers of services and consumers to find
one another, reducing search costs. For instance, Airbnb uses the scale of
the internet to list millions of rental properties to a large pool of potential
renters. According to a recent report, Airbnb now has four million listings in
191 countries worldwide, an amount that tops the 3.3 million room listings
globally held by the top five hotel brands combined (Marriott International,
Hilton Worldwide, Intercontinental Hotels, Wyndham Worldwide, and Hyatt
Hotels).75
Second, the sharing economy reduces the cost of entering into a legal
contract. Airbnb provides a standard form legal contract that regulates the
rights of both the property owners and the guests and provides property owners with insurance coverage that would be difficult for them to find on their
own.76 Finally, the peer-to-peer sharing economy for rental properties
through Airbnb significantly reduces monitoring costs by allowing property
71 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 396–97 (1937) (proving
that firms will grow to the extent that organizing transactions in the firm are cheaper than
contracting on the open market).
72 Id. at 392.
73 See id. at 388 (noting that a firm substitutes the pricing mechanism of the market
with “the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs production”).
74 See supra notes 71–72 accompanying text.
75 Updated Infographic: Look at Hotel Industry’s ‘Largest,’ HOTEL NEWS NOW (Feb. 14,
2017), http://hotelnewsnow.com/Articles/115537/Updated-infographic-Look-at-hotelindustrys-largest.
76 See Ron Lieber, A Liability Risk for Airbnb Hosts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2014), https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/12/06/your-money/airbnb-offers-homeowner-liability-coveragebut-hosts-still-have-risks.html?mcubz=0.
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owners and their guests to rate one another after each transaction. The
guests rate the quality of the rental property and the service provided by the
host and the property owner rates each guest. This dual rating system provides powerful incentives for each party to follow through on the terms of the
contract to assure the opportunity for more contracts in the future.77
Importantly, the consequences of reducing transaction costs matter
much more to the middle class than to the rich. First, agency costs tend to be
relatively fixed for a particular good or service. Thus, those costs constitute a
larger share of the total value of the exchange for less expensive properties,
goods, or services. As a result, fewer of these properties, goods, and services
will be offered when transaction costs are high, and that reduction in
exchange is considered to be a market failure that harms both providers of
goods and services and consumers.
Second, the sharing economy equalizes the quality of services and
reduces the difference in quality that previously existed between high-income
groups and the average middle-class group.78 The peer economy substitutes
online agency, like a mobile app or the internet, for the real, human agents.
This online agency makes less difference to the rich who employ full- or parttime agents in their household. These agents can drive cars, find the places
to stay that will match their deepest preferences, and generally get the right
people to work for them even for short-term tasks.
For instance, the founders of Uber began the service in part because San
Francisco’s radio car services and taxis offered such poor and expensive service.79 Uber and Lyft are thriving today because, by using modern information technology with its online agents, they offer superior services to
traditional taxis at prices that are often cheaper.80 By eroding the distinction
between the hail-and-dispatch markets, these on-demand apps provide far
more frictionless transportation services than traditional taxis.81
By radically changing the costs of search, Uber and Lyft now provide
transportation services to the average person that more closely resemble having a chauffeur, because the ridesharing services deliver drivers to riders on
demand at the press of a cell phone.82 And these benefits clearly help people of modest means because cabs are disproportionately used by people who
77 See Steven Tadelis, Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets, 8 ANN.
REV. ECON. 321, 328–29 (2016) (concluding that such mechanisms are crucial to success of
such markets).
78 Katie Benner, Airbnb Tries to Behave More Like a Hotel, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/17/technology/airbnbs-hosts-professional-hotels
.html?mcubz=0.
79 See ADAM LASHINSKY, WILD RIDE: INSIDE UBER’S QUEST FOR WORLD DOMINATION 71
(2017).
80 Sara Silverstein, These Animated Charts Tell You Everything About Uber Prices in 21 Cities,
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-vs-taxi-pricing-by-city2014-10?IR=T.
81 See James B. Speta, Southwest Airlines, MCI, and Now Uber: Lessons for Managing Competitive Entry into Taxi Markets, 43 TRANSP. L.J. 101, 111 (2016).
82 See id. at 117.
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may not have market alternatives for transportation, like the poor and disabled.83 Some of these benefits may be large, even lifesaving. A recent study
has shown that ambulance rides decline when ridesharing comes to town,
showing that ridesharing can in some circumstances be a more reliable form
of transport to the hospital even for serious matters.84 Besides the radically
improved convenience, the cost is lower too.85 And costs are particularly
lower for the high-value trips, like those to and from airports.86
And just as Airbnb has innovated and expanded on its original single
service, so have ridesharing companies expanded their offerings on a regular
basis. Uber and Lyft now allow consumers to share their rides with others at
a reduced fare through the options called uberPOOL and Lyft Line. The
GPS capabilities of the ridesharing apps make this kind of service more possible than before, because it can easily match people going in similar directions along similar routes, making ridesharing cheaper for all passengers
while ensuring the same compensation for the driver. Uber Express Pool
charges even less by picking people at designated places.87
UberPOOL provides an example of how innovative information technology is equalizing services down the income scale. UberPOOL is replacing
some public transportation.88 And yet the difference in quality between a
pooled car and public transportation is even greater than between a ride
summoned by an app and a taxi. Thus, such innovations suggest how the
sharing economy may move to deliver benefits down the income scale.
III. MEASURING

THE

EQUALIZING BENEFITS

OF THE

SHARING ECONOMY

As with many new technologies, the distinct advantages that the sharing
economy provides—in this case particularly the advantages to the bottom
83 Id. at 115 (citing Adrian T. Moore & Ted Balaker, Do Economists Reach a Conclusion
on Taxi Deregulation?, 3 ECON. J. WATCH 109, 109 (2006)).
84 See Leon S. Moskatel & David J.G. Slusksy, Did UberX Reduce Ambulance Volume? 9
(Univ. of Kan., Dep’t of Econ., Working Papers Series in Theoretical and Applied Economics No. 201708, 2017), http://www2.ku.edu/~kuwpaper/2017Papers/201708.pdf.
85 See Speta, supra note 81, at 118.
86 Id.
87 Josh Constine, Uber ‘Express POOL’ Offers the Cheapest Fare if You’ll Walk a Little, TECHCRUCH (Nov. 10, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/10/uber-express-pool/.
88 See Regina R. Clewlow & Gouri Shankar Mishra, Disruptive Transportation: The Adoption, Utilization, and Impacts of Ride-Hailing in the United States 27 (Inst. of Transp. Studies,
Univ. of Cal., Davis, Research Report UCD-ITS-RR-17-07, 2017) (finding a net six percent
decrease in public transit use in major cities as a result of ride-hailing substitutions); Nicole
Sadowsky & Erik Nelson, The Impact of Ride-Hailing Services on Public Transportation Use: A
Discontinuity Regression Analysis 11–12 (Bowdoin Coll. Econ. Dept. Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 13, 2017) (estimating that competition between Uber and Lyft depresses
ridesharing prices sufficiently to serve as a “public transportation substitute”); Jeff McMahon, UberPool and LyftLine Find the Gaps in Public Transit, FORBES (July 29, 2016), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2016/07/29/uberpool-and-lyftline-find-the-gaps-inpublic-transit/#2623da0e53cd (assessing where these services are superior to public
transport).
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ninety-nine percent—are often hard to measure. Quantitatively, the issue is
to determine the size of two kinds of benefits. First, what additional consumer surplus is created by the sharing economy and how is it distributed
among different economic classes? Second, what do the largely nonrich participants and hosts earn from the sharing economy and what other nonpecuniary benefits are earned?
Even without exact quantification it is easy to conclude that the consumer surplus of the sharing economy is large and growing. Many consumers now recognize that they would have to wait a lot longer and pay a lot
more to summon a taxi compared to using an on-demand ridesharing service
like Uber or Lyft.89 And Uber and Lyft’s phenomenal growth rates in revenues are some of the highest of any company in the history of the world, and
Airbnb’s growth is not far behind.90 The impressive growth rates of these
companies suggest that they are hitting the sweet spot for millions of
consumers.91
But in the case of Uber we have harder data, because another aspect of
the sharing economy is its creation of a huge amount of market data detailing the number of drivers, passengers, and the prices at which they contract
for each ride.92 This detailed market information allows the supply and
demand curves to be estimated and with them the surplus or value generated
for consumers from ridesharing services. University of Chicago economist
Steve Levitt found that in 2015 alone the additional consumer surplus within
the United States generated by Uber was about $7 billion.93 And that number does not include the surplus added by smaller competitors like Via, Gett,
and Lyft.
89 Silverstein, supra note 80; see also Chungsang Tom Lam & Meng Liu, Demand and
Consumer Surplus in the On-demand Economy: The Case of Ride Sharing 29 (Oct. 11,
2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2997190 (noting that a large share of consumer surplus derived from ridesharing applications is a result of shortened wait time with a small amount of consumer surplus attributable to price).
90 See Eric Newcomer, Uber, Lifting Financial Veil, Says Sales Growth Outpaces Losses,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-14/em
battled-uber-reports-strong-sales-growth-as-losses-continue. See generally Chiara Farronato &
Andrey Fradkin, The Welfare Effects of Peer Entry in the Accommodation Market: The
Case of Airbnb (Oct. 18, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://marketing.wharton.u
penn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/10-19-2017-Fradkin-Andrey-PAPER.pdf.
91 See Lam & Liu, supra note 89, at 9 (“[T]he sheer volume of realized transactions on
Uber and Lyft indicates consumers’ valuation, by revealed preference.”).
92 See Adam Creighton, Uber’s Pricing Formula Has Allowed Economists to Map Out a Real
Demand Curve, WALL ST. J.: REAL TIME ECON. (Sept. 19, 2016, 11:01 AM), https://blogs.wsj
.com/economics/2016/09/19/ubers-pricing-formula-has-allowed-economists-to-map-outa-real-demand-curve/.
93 Id.; see also Peter Cohen et al., Using Big Data to Estimate Consumer Surplus: The Case of
Uber 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22627, 2016), https://ideas.re
pec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/22627.html.
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According to yet another economic study, Airbnb has also boosted consumer surplus by offering consumers lower prices and increased selection.94
In 2014, the surplus was estimated to be about $350 million for the top ten
U.S. cities alone.95 A reasonable estimate of total surplus for the United
States might be about $700 million. Given the increase in bookings Airbnb is
experiencing, this surplus could have reached more than two billion dollars
in 2017 and is likely to increase another tenfold by 2025.96 These benefits to
consumers do not count any that are provided by new, smaller housing services that have arisen to compete with Airbnb.97
And then to properly account for all of the increase in consumer value
from the peer economy, we would have to include the added consumer surplus from all other smaller companies and web platforms in other areas of
the sharing economy. There might be an additional annual consumer surplus of a few billion dollars generated directly by the companies themselves,
for a total of between five and ten billion dollars from the sharing economy.
And given that the sharing economy is supposed to grow by a factor of ten in
less than seven years, we can expect a surplus soon in the hundreds of billions of dollars.98
These numbers do not include all the added consumer surplus generated by the improvements in incumbent services because of the entry of
ridesharing companies, for example, by taxis that have improved their service
and/or lowered fares in response to competition from the ridesharing services.99 For instance, the number of complaints against traditional taxis substantially decreased following the arrival of ridesharing services.100
The other equalizing effect of the sharing economy is the new utility,
both income and improved working conditions, that is being generated for
service providers. Services like Airbnb can unlock large amounts of
underused capital assets.101 We have already noted that the average income
of a single property Airbnb host is very substantial, about fourteen percent of
the average wage.102 Airbnb hosts observe that because of the infrastructure
and service provided by Airbnb, the time they spend on management tasks
94 See Farronato & Fradkin, supra note 90, at 3–4.
95 See id. at 2.
96 See Clay Dillow, Can Airbnb Book a Billion Nights a Year by 2025?, FORTUNE (Apr. 11,
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/11/airbnb-bookings-one-billion-a-year/.
97 HomeAway may be the biggest of these. See HOMEAWAY, https://www.homeaway
.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
98 See Niam Yaraghi & Shamika Ravi, The Current and Future State of the Sharing Economy
3 (Brookings India IMPACT Series No. 032017, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/sharingeconomy_032017final.pdf.
99 SCOTT WALLSTEN, TECH. POLICY INST., THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF THE SHARING
ECONOMY: HOW IS UBER CHANGING TAXIS? (2015); see also Adi Gaskell, Study Explores the
Impact of Uber on the Taxi Industry, FORBES (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
adigaskell/2017/01/26/study-explores-the-impact-of-uber-on-the-taxi-industry/.
100 WALLSTEN, supra note 99, at 19.
101 See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.
102 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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for their rentals is not hugely burdensome.103 But for those property owners
who would prefer to outsource these services to somebody else, companies
have grown up recently to handle the details of Airbnb reservations and
cleaning the spaces to be rented.104
There is also strong reason to believe that ridesharing has improved the
employment opportunities of many of its drivers. Ridesharing has attracted
many drivers—one estimate has suggested that Uber may have a million drivers in the United States alone.105 Second, studies funded by Uber suggest
that drivers earn substantially more than the minimum wage, and more than
taxi drivers.106 But even if Uber drivers earned only a little more than the
minimum wage, the job would be worth a lot more to them than most minimum wage jobs.107
One advantage is that Uber and Lyft drivers do not have a set schedule,
but instead work completely flexible hours at their own convenience. That
flexibility allows ridesharing drivers to schedule their time to do other work
(sometimes full-time jobs), do chores, go to school, or care for family members. For those drivers, their only other alternative to a fixed-hour work
schedule might be going on welfare or disability. And it is important to note
that rideshare drivers have substantially more flexibility than taxi drivers who
could rent a cab for a day, because rideshare drivers make stop/start decisions continuously throughout the day at their own convenience.
A recent study found that having complete flexibility over the number of
hours worked is worth as much to Uber drivers as forty percent of the value
of their total earnings, or about $150 a week.108 In other words, most Uber
drivers prefer a flexible driving schedule with lower wages to a job that pays
higher wages with a fixed work schedule. If they were required to be
103 See Airi Lampinen & Coye Cheshire, Hosting via Airbnb: Motivations and Financial
Assurances in Monetized Network Hospitality, CHI ’16: PROCS. OF THE 2016 CHI CONF. ON HUM.
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS., May 2016, 1669, at 1673 (quoting an Airbnb host as remarking
upon the convenience provided by the Airbnb infrastructure: “I guess the payment would
just happen. I think it was just taken care of automatically by Airbnb”).
104 See Marianna Sigala, Market Formation in the Sharing Economy: Findings and Implications
From the Sub-Economies of Airbnb, in SOCIAL DYNAMICS IN A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE 159, 160
(Sergio Barile et al. eds., 2018) (noting that the subeconomy of Airbnb is made up primarily of businesses that “basically support Airbnb hosts by outsourcing them (accommodation) management services that are primarily found in the traditional hospitality
industry”).
105 See Melissa Berry, How Many Uber Drivers Are There?, RIDESHARE GUY (Nov. 3, 2017),
https://therideshareguy.com/how-many-uber-drivers-are-there/.
106 See Niall McCarthy, Fare Deal? How the Hourly Earnings of Uber and Taxi Drivers Measure Up, FORBES (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2016/11/
28/fare-deal-how-the-hourly-earnings-of-uber-and-taxi-drivers-measure-up-infographic/#6a
a69dc6689a.
107 See infra notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
108 M. Keith Chen et al., The Value of Flexible Work: Evidence From Uber Drivers 45 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23296, 2017), http://www.nber.org/pa
pers/w23296.
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employed on fixed schedules they would reduce their hours by two-thirds.109
This is a powerful example of the improved working conditions that the sharing economy can provide employees.
Moreover, another great advantage of working for ridesharing services is
safety. Traditional taxi drivers have faced risks of bodily assault and even
death at the hands of passengers who are disgruntled or have targeted them
for robbery.110 Indeed, in years past they have often been at greater risk of
fatality from homicides than driving accidents.111
Yet, because all Uber and Lyft customers must provide credit card information to use ridesharing services, the passengers are identified and traceable, and thus are less likely to commit assaults or crimes against drivers or
damage their vehicles.112 Further, nonpayment risk is reduced since the passengers’ credit cards are on file and charged for each ride.113 And because
passengers receive ratings from drivers after each ride, those passengers who
are abusive or disorderly will receive low ratings and can be avoided by Uber
and Lyft drivers.114 The rich, similarly, have generally had safe, hassle-free
jobs.
To be sure, most of the previous discussion of reasons that the consumer
surplus has tended to go disproportionately to the nonrich has been a qualitative argument rather than quantitative. But one recent study of one aspect
of the sharing economy does provide quantitative evidence that the gains to
suppliers and surplus to consumers redound to the nonrich. Economists
measured the effects of Getaround,115 a service that permits peer-to-peer
rentals of cars.116 They found the gains to the automobile industry’s consumer surplus to be substantial.117 And the gains were concentrated in those
with below-median incomes.118 The reasons for this dispersion of consumer
surplus were twofold. First, below-median income consumers were more
109 Id. Taxicab drivers never have hours as flexible as Uber drivers, because while some
may be able to decide whether to rent a cab for a particular day, they cannot decide to stop
and start continuously, thus preventing them from making continuous decisions about
what is worth more to them—work or leisure.
110 See MATTHEW FEENEY, CATO INST., IS RIDESHARING SAFE? 1 (2015) (“[T]he ridesharing business model offers big safety advantages as far as drivers are concerned. . . . [C]ashfree transactions and self-identified customers substantially mitigate one of the worst risks
associated with traditional taxis: the risk of violent crime.”).
111 See, e.g., BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2014 CENSUS OF FATAL
OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES (FINAL DATA) 19, https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cftb0291
.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2018).
112 See FEENEY, supra note 110, at 3–4.
113 See id. at 3.
114 See id. at 4 (noting how Uber and Lyft drivers have a safety advantage over taxi
drivers because they “know[ ] the identity of their passengers”).
115 See GETAROUND, https://www.getaround.com/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
116 Samuel Fraiberger & Arun Sundararajan, Peer–to–Peer Rental Markets in the Sharing Economy 2 (Sept. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2574337.
117 Id. at 4.
118 Id.
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likely to rent their cars.119 Second, below-median consumers were more
likely to forego purchasing cars because they could rent them more easily
and cheaply when they wanted.120 It is not clear that the rest of the sharing
economy delivers benefits disproportionately to people below the median,
but the same reasoning suggests that it will deliver its benefits disproportionately to people who are not high income. People of modest income will be
more interested in being providers and consumers in these markets than the
rich.
Some critics of the sharing economy claim that it is destroying some
jobs, like those of traditional taxi drivers or housekeepers at hotels. This type
of argument has been made for centuries, ever since the Luddites famously
argued in the 1800s that new kinds of weaving machines were taking away
jobs from those who had previously been weaving textiles by hand.121 Economists almost universally view the Luddite movement as presumptively invalid.122 It even gets its own name as a characteristic error in social thought:
the “lump of labor fallacy.”123 The fallacy, or mistake, is to view the number
of jobs in society as fixed.124 In reality, new jobs are always created when
some jobs disappear, but the number of new jobs always outnumbers the jobs
destroyed, leading to a net increase in jobs.125 The number of jobs is never
limited, because people’s desires for goods and services are potentially unlimited.126 And in the long run the new jobs have paid higher wages than the
old jobs lost, because of the greater wealth and economic growth that result
from innovation and advances in technology.127
But even setting aside this general argument, we can see some particular
ways that the sharing economy itself is likely to create more jobs than it eliminates. Airbnb serves many people who might not stay at a hotel, because they
cannot afford one, prefer a more intimate setting, or value a larger living
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See Lehman, supra note 62, at 265 (“Fear of job loss attributed to increased technology in the workplace has recently reached a high point perhaps not seen since the Luddite
uprisings and property destruction in British textile factories more than two hundred years
ago.”).
122 See id. (noting that economists “should be naturally skeptical of Luddite fallacies”).
123 Paul Krugman, Lumps of Labor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2003), https://www.nytimes
.com/2003/10/07/opinion/lumps-of-labor.html.
124 See id.
125 See Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, Will Humans Go the Way of Horses?, FOREIGN
AFF., July–Aug. 2015, at 8, 8 (“[R]eal wages and the number of jobs have increased relatively steadily throughout the industrialized world since the middle of the nineteenth century, even as technology advanced like never before.”).
126 See David Hamilton, What Has Evolutionary Economics to Contribute to Consumption Theory?, 7 J. ECON. ISSUES 197, 205 (1973) (noting how the proliferation of technology indicates “the human animal seems able to create the necessary demand and the necessary
means of satisfying this demand”).
127 See generally Brynjolfsson & McAfee, supra note 125.
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space than a hotel room.128 This expansion of travel experiences through
Airbnb creates more jobs. Cleaning staff, for instance, are employed to tidy
up rental spaces after guests leave.129 The “host” jobs that Airbnb is generating for local guides have no counterparts in the hotel industry and few in the
travel industry in general.130 At least so far, the hotel industry and its
employees do not seem to be suffering. Hotel occupancy rates remain high,
suggesting that Airbnb is not generally taking business away from hotels as
much as it is expanding travel experiences by bringing in new renters.131
Similarly, ridesharing services have expanded the number of people
using transportation services and hiring cars driven by others. Thus, the total
number of jobs for car drivers has gone up.132 To be sure, the ridesharing
services have taken away some business from traditional taxis, which has certainly reduced the number of traditional taxi drivers.133 However, it is not
clear how much that change substantially harms those who were previously
driving traditional taxis for a taxi company, because they can easily choose to
instead drive for ridesharing services with the advantages of safety and
greater flexibility in scheduling.134
It is true that some owners of taxi medallions have been harmed.135
When government-enforced scarcity of taxi medallions is eroded by new technologies, those who previously profited from the government regulation are
indeed worse off. But this kind of regulation that limits entry is unlikely to
help address income inequality overall because it prevents those with limited
capital from entering the taxi business. Like ridesharing companies, the
owners of medallions were also intermediaries between drivers and passengers, but they offered experiences that were less equalizing for drivers and
passengers alike. The drivers lacked the valuable flexibility of making their
own decisions when to drive, and passengers did not get the luxury of online
ride hailing.
128 See Farronato & Fradkin, supra note 90, at 1 (noting how most Airbnb “bookings
would not have resulted in hotel bookings had Airbnb not been available”).
129 See Kia Kokalitcheva, Airbnb Lets Trusted Hosts Manage Others’ Home-Rental Listings,
FORTUNE (Sept. 16, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/15/airbnb-co-hosting/.
130 See Host an Experience on Airbnb, supra note 55.
131 See Modest Growth to Continue for U.S. Hotels, HOTEL NEWS RESOURCE (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://www.hotelnewsresource.com/article95851.html.
132 See Thor Berger et al., Drivers of Disruption? Estimating the Uber Effect 2 (Oxford Martin Programme on Tech. & Emp’t, Working Paper No. 2387, 2017) https://www.oxford
martin.ox.ac.uk/publications/view/2387 (“[O]ur point estimates consistently suggest that
the labor supply of traditional taxi drivers increased in cities where Uber was introduced
relative to cities where it was not . . . .”).
133 See id. at 8 (“[W]age-employed taxi drivers saw relative income declines after Uber’s
introduction . . . .”).
134 See id. at 7 (“Uber’s introduction [has] led to a relative increase in self employment
among taxi drivers.”).
135 See WALLSTEN, supra note 99, at 4 (“By 2015 . . . the price of a medallion [in New
York City] had fallen by about 25 percent in response to competition from ride-sharing
services.”).
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In fact, U.S. courts have, specifically in the case of Uber, recognized the
value that the sharing economy brings to a particular city.136 In a decision
finding that Uber’s entry into the Philadelphia market was not anticompetitive, the Third Circuit highlighted the benefits Uber brought to consumers—
benefits such as “lower prices, more available taxicabs, and a high-tech alternative to the customary method of hailing taxicabs and paying for rides.”137
Furthermore, the court noted that Uber’s economic efficiency is also advantageous and should “be encouraged, because that often translates to
enhanced competition among market players, better products, and lower
prices for consumers.”138
Another equality argument against the sharing economy is that it makes
a few people very rich: Travis Kalanick, the founder of Uber, and Brian
Chesky, the founder of Airbnb, have become so rich that they are members
of the Forbes 400.139 This accretion of wealth to a few individuals counts
somewhat against the equalizing effects of the sharing economy, but not as
much as one might think. First, most of the value of startups goes to venture
capital funds and much of the money in venture capital funds in turn comes
from other actors, like pension funds, where profits redound much more
diffusely.140
Moreover, the market cap of these firms is much less than the consumer
surplus they deliver. For instance, the market cap of Uber is about $50 billion141 and the yearly consumer surplus is currently $7 billion.142 At a discount rate of five percent, the future stream of surplus is worth about $140
billion, assuming that surplus remains the same. But Uber has such a high
valuation precisely because it is thought that it will grow to deliver much
more consumer surplus in the future.
And the market is almost surely right, because the equalizing effects of
the sharing economy will grow in importance as the younger generations age
and become an even more important demographic group of consumers.143
136 See Daniel Wiessner, 3rd Circuit Rejects Philly Cab Companies’ Antitrust Claims Against
Uber, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/antitrust-uber/3rd-circuit-rejects-philly-cab-companies-antitrust-claims-against-uber-idUSL1N1R91YQ.
137 Phila. Taxi Ass’n v. Uber Techs., Inc., 886 F.3d 332, 340 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
No. 18-32, 2018 WL 3306879 (Oct. 1, 2018).
138 Id.
139 Forbes 400, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/forbes-400/list/ (last updated Oct. 3,
2018).
140 Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1998, at 131,
https://hbr.org/1998/11/how-venture-capital-works.
141 See Johanna Interian, Note, Up in the Air: Harmonizing the Sharing Economy Through
Airbnb Regulations, 39 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 132 (2016) (citing Scott Austin et al.,
The Billion Dollar Startup Club: All Companies as of October 2015, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2015),
http://graphics.wsj.com/billion-dollar-club/).
142 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
143 See Neil Charness & Walter R. Boot, Aging and Information Technology Use: Potential
and Barriers, 18 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 253, 253 (2009) (noting that the “digital
divide” caused by an aging population in a society of rapid technological progress “favor[s]
younger adopters”).
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Seventy-two percent of all Americans have used the sharing economy for at
least one transaction.144 About a third of those who are under forty-five have
used the peer economy for transactions with four different services.145
Thus, the differential use of the sharing economy by age groups shows
that in a technologically accelerating society, age can become a fundamental
axis of inequality.146 Younger people are more likely to take advantage of
technological advances than older people because they are comfortable with
technology.147 As technology accelerates, this axis makes the young systematically better off than the old. But substituting this kind of inequality for more
material forms of inequality reduces inequality in any morally disquieting
sense. First, the old have far more assets than the young.148 Second and
even more importantly, most of the young will become old and likely face
technological disadvantages vis-à-vis the future generations.
And further developments are likely to make the sharing economy even
more favorable for workers and consumers as compared to the investors in
companies that facilitate these markets. Blockchain provides a decentralized
intermediary for the sharing economy that is an alternative to a corporation
managing the distribution of goods and services that is the essence of the
sharing economy. Blockchains can create a peer-to-peer network for financial transactions on top of the internet.149 It allows participants in a sharing
economy to create a network cooperative.150 The transparent verification
process can assure that these rules are enforced among participants.151
Thus, essentially, a sharing economy cooperative using blockchain
would eliminate the corporate intermediary that manages the network of service providers through its administration. This development can also be
explained in terms of Coasean law and economics. By providing a transparent way of enforcing contracts and eliminating opportunism, blockchain so
much lowers the transaction costs of enforcing long-term complex contracts
that groups of people can collaborate in a network rather than use a corpo144 JACOB GALLEY, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, AWARENESS AND USAGE OF THE
SHARING ECONOMY 1 (2016), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2016/beyond-bls/pdf/aware
ness-and-usage-of-the-sharing-economy.pdf.
145 Id.
146 Cf. Charness & Boot, supra note 143, at 255 (noting that new technologies are often
“not designed with [the aging population’s] capabilities in mind”).
147 Cf. id. (establishing how older adults’ lack of comfort with new technologies makes
adoption less likely).
148 RICHARD FRY ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE OLD PROSPER RELATIVE TO THE YOUNG:
THE RISING AGE GAP IN ECONOMIC WELL-BEING (2011), http://www.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/3/2011/11/WealthReportFINAL.pdf.
149 See Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 118, https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain.
150 See Primavera De Filippi, What Blockchain Means for the Sharing Economy, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Mar. 15, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/what-blockchain-means-for-the-sharingeconomy.
151 Id.
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rate intermediary that charges them for administration.152 It is another step
in the ongoing dematerialization of the world, which equalizes the positions
of people along the income scale because they no longer have to pay for
agents.153 Just as sharing economy companies replaced less efficient
intermediaries, like owners of taxi medallions, so may blockchain in turn displace these companies.
Already, small-scale blockchain cooperatives are appearing. For
instance, Swarm City provides a blockchain to be an intermediary for
ridesharing.154 As blockchains mature and millennials more comfortable
with such technology become a greater portion of the workforce, these kinds
of cooperatives can grow. Even if they do not displace more traditional
ridesharing companies, like Uber and Lyft, they will put pressure on these
companies, requiring them to give better deals for their drivers.
IV. REGULATION’S DANGER TO THE EQUALIZING FEATURES
OF THE SHARING ECONOMY
Given the benefits of the sharing economy for equality as well as efficiency, care should be taken to avoid regulations that would undermine
these features. Proponents of increased regulation of the sharing economy
often exaggerate the benefits they expect the regulations to produce and
downplay the likelihood or extent to which greater regulation can stifle innovation, be subject to regulatory capture by established businesses, harm the
poor and the marginalized, and produce uncertainty.155 And, in many cases,
the proponents of these regulations fail to take into consideration the unique
features of the sharing economy, such as the jobs available and the individuals willing to do them.
The desire to regulate the sharing economy must be balanced against
not only the unintended harms that poorly thought-out regulations can produce, but also the myriad benefits that the sharing economy creates for society at large. Uber, for example, can provide greater job and income-earning
opportunities for racial minorities and immigrants, a “multiplier” effect of
“increased consumer spending and revitalization of downtown commercial
areas” to which consumers have easier access, increased tax revenues, and
even safer roads.156 And, despite critics’ claims that Airbnb has led to
152 See Sinclair Davidson et al., Economics of Blockchain 8 (March 8, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2744751.
153 See De Filippi, supra note 150.
154 What is Swarm City?, SWARM CITY, https://thisis.swarm.city/ (last visited Aug. 26,
2018).
155 See generally Ilya Shapiro & David McDonald, Regulation Uber Alles: How Governments
Hurt Workers and Consumers in the New New Economy, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 461.
156 Id. at 475 (“According to a report by Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Uber’s entry
into Seattle was associated with a ten percent decrease in DUIs, and a Benenson Strategy
Group survey found that ‘88% of respondents over the age of 21 agree with the statement
that ‘Uber has made it easier for me to avoid driving home when I’ve had too much to
drink,’ and 70–80 percent said Uber has made it less likely that their friends drive after
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shortages of affordable housing and increased rents in densely populated
urban areas, there is little evidence to back this up. In fact, there is greater
support for the propositions that stringent regulatory policies have led to
these negative consequences and that Airbnb helps alleviate this problem by
giving low-income individuals and families an opportunity to earn extra
income.157
This Part offers a framework for evaluating regulations, including a
number of those that scholars have for some time predicted would emerge at
the state and local levels.158 Regulations that are simply designed to protect
incumbents are obviously detrimental, because the sharing economy expands
entry to the benefit of both consumers and new providers. Some new regulations may be justified as ways of preventing sharing economies from engaging
in regulatory arbitrage. Through such arbitrage these companies make
money by getting around public-regarding regulations that applied to the old
economy. But whether regulatory arbitrage is in the public interest depends
upon whether those prior regulations are delivering the same benefits as they
did before the advent of the sharing economy. In many cases, as with regulations of driver safety for passengers and regulation of the employment relationship with companies, they need to be reconsidered because of
technological change that redounds to the benefit of efficiency and equality.
In contrast, the sharing economy should not be allowed to exploit loopholes
in taxation, because the need for progressive taxation of economic activity
remains unchanged with the sharing economy. Finally, some regulations
focus on new risks that the sharing economy may be creating. For instance,
some jurisdictions have prohibited home sharing on the grounds that it will
raise the price of housing in the jurisdiction. Such regulations need to be
scrutinized, however, to determine whether they are counterproductive and
pretexts for incumbent protection.
A.

Incumbent Protection

Much of the opposition to the peer economy comes largely from legacy
incumbent businesses, like traditional taxi companies or hotels.159 The
incumbent businesses are frequently well-organized special interest groups
drinking.” (footnote omitted) (quoting BENENSON STRATEGY GRP., STUDY: DRIVING CHOICE
TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS (2015), https://www.bsgco.com/insights/study-drinkingdriving-and-transportation-options)).
157 Id. at 480.
158 See, e.g., Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government Law:
The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901 (2015).
159 See Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts:
How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 293, 307
(2016) (noting that much of the regulation of the sharing economy “seems to be designed
to block the development of software platforms (or other new entrants) in order to protect
incumbents”).
AND
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and many have long-established connections with local politicians.160 The
result has been attempts to ban outright the expansion of the innovative and
generally equalizing services that have emerged in the peer economy.161
These efforts would obviously undermine the greater quality in income production and consumption that the sharing economy brings.
Some incumbent businesses have made blatant claims for being protected from competition. For instance, in Milwaukee, traditional taxi companies argued that since the city had granted a specific number of licenses for
taxis, permitting Uber to operate at all was a “taking” of their property by the
city government.162 Richard Posner, the former Seventh Circuit judge who is
also a famous law and economics theorist, dismissed this argument. Judge
Posner held bluntly that “taxi permits issued by the Milwaukee city government are property, but have not been ‘taken,’ as they do not confer on the
holders a property right in, amounting to control over, all transportation by
taxis and taxi substitutes . . . in Milwaukee.”163 Then he noted that the cab
drivers’ losses are simply the result of the operation of the free market:
“Undoubtedly by freeing up entry into the taxi business the new ordinance
will reduce the revenues of individual taxicab companies; that is simply the
normal consequence of replacing a cartelized with a competitive market.”164
Philadelphia taxicab companies also alleged that Uber attempted to
monopolize the market in violation of federal antitrust laws. But in another
example of courts upholding Uber’s legality against claims of anticompetitive
behavior, the Third Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that Uber “bolstered competition by offering customers lower prices, more available taxicabs, and a high-tech alternative.”165 The court added that “[r]unning a
business with greater economic efficiency” is not anticompetitive; in fact, it
“enhance[s] competition” by leading to “better products, and lower
prices.”166 As discussed before, this market delivers equalizing benefits to
both providers and consumers.

160 See id. at 306 (“[R]egulators may become closely linked to the firms they regulate,
often through extended discussions, career trajectories, or a desire to maintain the status
quo.” (citing Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jérôme Pouyet, The Subsidiarity Bias in Regulation, 88 J.
PUB. ECON. 255, 255 (2003)).
161 See id. at 307 (“[L]icensing also invites license-holders to pressure public authorities
to exclude new entrants from the market, as such market entry would create new competition and reduce the value of their licenses.”); see also id. (noting how Uber’s presence in
France brought violent protests causing the French Parliament to pass a law designed to
hinder the sharing economy).
162 Joe Sanfelippo Cabs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 839 F.3d 613, 614 (7th Cir. 2016).
163 Id. at 616.
164 Id.
165 Phila. Taxi Ass’n v. Uber Techs., Inc., 886 F.3d 332, 340 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
No. 18-32, 2018 WL 3306879 (Oct. 1, 2018).
166 Id.
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Distinguishing Good from Bad Regulatory Arbitrage

A more plausible kind of regulation is one premised on the notion that
sharing economy firms are profiting from avoiding regulations that are in the
public interest, not just the incumbents’ interests. Thus, the regulation
should be imposed to close the loopholes the sharing economy has
exploited. But regulatory arbitrage can be good, if it forces rethinking the
need for particular kinds of regulation that may need modification in a world
where transaction costs have changed.
Consider the effort to argue that it is in the public interest for safety that
these new services be placed under the same regulatory scheme that their
incumbent taxi competitors face.167 Thus, Uber drivers should face the same
requirements as taxicab drivers, such as being fingerprinted and going
through a background check.
But applying the same existing regulations to these new ridesharing services ignores the innovations that Uber and Lyft bring. Uber and Lyft platforms set up legal contracts between the driver and the rider using the
ridesharing app that also transfers funds from the passengers.168 It is no
longer the anonymous relationship of that which exists when a passenger
hails a taxi on the street. Uber and Lyft vet the drivers, and the riders provide credit card information to the ridesharing services.169 The driver rating
system used by each passenger after each ride then also gives drivers far
greater incentives to behave well than those faced by a typical taxi driver.170
Coase’s analysis of agency costs helps show why regulation of ridesharing
services is less necessary to protect safety. Government regulation may be
essential when high transaction costs make it difficult to establish a workable
contractual relationship where each side has confidence in the other’s performance. But one of the greatest successes of the sharing economy has
been to reduce transaction costs and make a greater variety of low-cost contracts workable and practical. When the buyer and seller of a service have
167 See, e.g., Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 5, at 1645–46 (noting how critics of the sharing economy argue that the skirting of traditional regulations makes the sharing economy
“underinsured, less safe, [and] less sanitary” than their traditional counterparts (first citing
Adrienne LaFrance & Rose Eveleth, Are Taxis Safer than Uber?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 3, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/03/are-taxis-safer-than-uber/
386207/; then citing Amanda MacMillan, 6 Health Risks of Staying in Someone Else’s Home,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/13/healthrisks-staying-over_n_6146974.html)).
168 See Edelman & Geradin, supra note 159, at 297 (noting that a defining characteristic
of sharing economy platforms is how they “place[ ] the entire transaction (including
search, pricing, payment, and evaluation) onto the platform”).
169 See Michael C. Munger, Tomorrow 3.0: The Sharing Economy, 20 INDEP. REV. 391, 394
(2016) (noting how the information provided by sharing economy platforms—in the form
of “ratings and reputation”—serve as a form of vetting for security purposes, while the
platforms’ processing of the financial transaction “remov[es] most of the risk of robbery or
reneging”).
170 See Edelman & Geradin, supra note 159, at 300.
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greater assurance of each other’s good behavior for ridesharing services, less
government regulation is needed.
Simply applying the same rules to ridesharing companies with ratings
systems without allowing for the effects of these systems on safety creates a
form of anticonsumer incumbent protection. Moreover, if requiring costly
background check obligations causes ridesharing companies to withdraw
their services, both riders and drivers will lose the benefit of their equalizing
features.171 Indeed, if a rating system provides more safety over time for
both driver and rider, one of the non-price-equalizing features lost will be
greater safety for people of modest means, the kind of safety the rich have
always enjoyed.
It does not follow that because the ratings system strengthens the reputational road to safety, that no other regulation other than permitting such a
system to satisfy safety requirements is needed.172 But any safety requirement
needs to be reconsidered in light of the safety that such a rating system
brings. Then taxi companies should be given the option of using a ratings
system to enjoy the advantages of the ratcheting down requirements.173
Another concern is that the sharing economy’s business model depends
on treating those offering services as independent contractors rather than as
employees.174 The arguments that this is a form of regulatory arbitrage differ in detail, both because the sharing and gig economies differ in their
details from one area to another, and because the distinction between
employees and contractors differs legally depending on the exact situation
and the specific jurisdiction. But the basic argument is that a company like
Uber exercises sufficient control over its drivers that they should be classified
as employees and not as independent contractors.175
But if the traditional rules undermine the benefits of the sharing economy, they should be updated if the gains to both equality and efficiency are
to be realized.176 Just as treating new workers in the emerging peer economy
171 See Eliana Dockterman & Time, Uber and Lyft Are Leaving Austin After Losing Background Check Vote, FORTUNE (May 8, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/08/uber-lyft-leav
ing-austin/ (noting that fingerprinting hurts part-time drivers, “the heart of Lyft’s peer-topeer model”).
172 See Speta, supra note 81, at 123.
173 Id. at 124.
174 See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
175 See id. at 1137 (“Uber is deeply involved in . . . qualifying and selecting drivers,
regulating and monitoring their performance, disciplining (or terminating) those who fail
to meet standards, and setting prices.”).
176 See Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for
Twenty-First-Century Work: The “Independent Worker” 8 (Brookings Inst., The Hamilton Project
Discussion Paper 2015-10, 2015), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/moderniz
ing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf (“Forcing these new
forms of work into a traditional employment relationship could be an existential threat to
the emergence of online-intermediated work, with adverse consequences for workers, consumers, businesses, and the economy.”); see also id. at 14 (“[Such an employment classification] should be efficient in the sense that it enables workers and intermediaries to
maximize the joint surplus that their relationship produces.”).
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under the same public safety regulations as the old economy ignores the significant safety advantages that the sharing economy brings to customers, so
treating gig economy workers for all purposes as traditional employees
reduces the advantages that workers get from the sharing economy—autonomy, safety, and flexibility.
Thus, many regulations that would force Uber drivers to work a certain
set of hours or force ridesharing companies to monitor their drivers closely
would deprive drivers of the autonomy and flexibility that are big benefits of
the sharing economy. For instance, many drivers keep their apps on even
when they are not working and switch among different ridesharing companies.177 While this promotes flexibility and autonomy for the driver, it is
inconsistent with many of the legal duties attributed to an employer.178
Moreover, the ability of drivers themselves to enter the market at the
hours they want is also crucial to expanding supply at the appropriate times
to match demand. A traditional employee-employer relationship, where
hours are under the employer’s direct control, would undermine the benefits
of the sharing economy in ridesharing. Each individual driver makes a decision to drive based on how likely he is to obtain customers. This judgment is
obviously unpredictable, depending on such matters as the exact weather
conditions and public and private events in the area. The market will reach
equilibrium faster when more participants are able to make decisions about
entering it, exploiting the wisdom of crowds. This important economic reality allows ridesharing to deliver its equalizing benefits.
Regrettably, a recent California Supreme Court ruling179 threatens to
impose this corporate-employee relationship on companies providing services in the sharing economy.180 In a case involving a delivery company, the
California Supreme Court “ruled that employers must treat workers who do
work related to a company’s ‘usual course of business’ as full-fledged employees.”181 The key feature of this ruling is that the presumption will be that
workers are not independent contractors, but rather are employees, and
companies trying to classify their workers as independent contractors must
satisfy each element of the California court’s new test.182
Consequently, scholars predict that prices of sharing economy services
in California will likely rise, as the higher payroll taxes and additional
expenses that accompany the conversion of independent contractors to
employees may “increase an employer’s costs by about 25 to 40 percent per
177 See id. at 9.
178 See id. (noting that in this situation, “[i]f anything, Uber and Lyft are competitors
for the driver’s services, not co-employers”).
179 Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018).
180 Klint Finley, A California Ruling Threatens the Gig Economy, WIRED (May 2, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/a-california-ruling-threatens-the-gig-economy/.
181 Id.
182 Ian Adams & Brian Jencunas, Economic Costs and Policy Alternatives to California’s
Dynamex Decision 1, 3 (R Street Policy Study No. 145, 2018), https://www.rstreet.org/
2018/06/13/economic-costs-and-policy-alternatives-to-californias-dynamex-decision/.
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worker.”183 Furthermore, smaller companies could have a much more difficult time breaking into the sharing economy,184 and the ruling could undermine the quintessential benefit of the sharing economy—flexible hours and
work arrangements that give more people an opportunity to take advantage
of the sharing economy.185
Once again, Coase’s analysis of agency costs helps to understand the
issue at hand. Advances in technology have made it possible for individuals
to contract efficiently with one another directly (peer-to-peer) without
requiring them to be part of the same company.186 Getting rid of the corporate-employee relationship eliminates the rigidity and inefficiency of that
traditional relationship, which can restore valuable autonomy and flexibility
to an individual contract worker. And that flexibility and autonomy can provide great value to an independent contractor.
Some have suggested that the way to handle sharing economy workers is
to have hybrid classifications, giving independent contractors some of the
regulatory benefits of being an employee without creating structures that
would lead Uber to eliminate the benefits of the sharing economy, such as
flexible hours.187 For instance, a jurisdiction might try to assure that Uber
drivers are getting a minimum wage for hours worked.188 From an egalitarian standpoint, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with such proposals, but
the equalizing features of this economy suggest the checklist that such hybrid
regulations should satisfy. First, they must not undermine the equalizing
benefits, such as regulations that make it impossible for workers to enjoy the
autonomy and flexibility of setting their own hours. Second, they must not
be so burdensome as to make it more difficult for sharing economies to offer
183 Finley, supra note 180; see also Adams & Jencunas, supra note 182, at 3
(“[I]ndependent contractors cost only 66 cents on the dollar for every hour worked by a
full-time employee.”); Andrei Hagiu & Julian Wright, The Status of Workers and Platforms
in the Sharing Economy (June 20, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), www.andreihagiu
.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Liquidity-constraint-06202018.pdf.
184 Professor Arun Sundararajan of New York University Stern School of Business, said:
“[P]rices will be higher, at least in California . . . . [N]ewer, smaller companies will have a
much harder time than well-funded companies like Uber and Lyft, which will be better
able to absorb costs and have established large labor forces.” Finley, supra note 180.
185 See Adams & Jencunas, supra note 182, at 4; Helen Floersh, Business Groups Appeal to
State on Dynamex Decision, SAN FERNANDO VALLEY BUS. J. (June 27, 2018), www.sfvbj.com/
news/2018/jun/27/business-groups-appeal-state-dynamex-decision/.
186 See Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work,
Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the “Gig Economy,” 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 476
(2016); see also Marina Lao, Workers in the “Gig” Economy: The Case for Extending the Antitrust
Labor Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543 (2018).
187 See Andre Andoyan, Comment, Independent Contractor or Employee: I’m Uber Confused!
Why California Should Create an Exception for Uber Drivers and the “On-Demand Economy,” 47
GOLDEN GATE. U. L. REV. 153, 172 (2017) (discussing danger that classifying Uber drivers
as employees would result in much more hierarchical relation between drivers and owners); see also Harris & Krueger, supra note 176, at 10 (proposing “a new legal and economic
category of independent workers”).
188 Andoyan, supra note 188, at 168.
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their services, thus limiting the circle of those who benefit. Third, in setting
out notions of equality, regulations must take account of the nonpecuniary
benefits of the sharing economy. Thus, if a hybrid regulation tried to provide a minimum wage, it should include in its calculation the benefits of the
very flexible hours offered by sharing economy jobs. Otherwise, the minimum wage laws will have the perverse effect of penalizing jobs that offer
workers more overall utility.
But there are also examples of regulatory arbitrage that consist of avoiding the incidence of justified regulations, like taxes. Many observers have
noted that because of the current tax system, much of the income from the
sharing economy is unreported.189 Sharing economy companies must report
to the federal government income that is paid by a consumer to a service
provider using their platforms, but only if that income exceeds $20,000 a
year.190 However, many participants use more than one service to earn
income, such as when car owners drive for both Lyft and Uber, thus taking
advantage of ways of staying under that threshold.
Commentators have made thoughtful proposals to correct this problem
by a combination of creating more capacious withholding and, at the same
time, writing regulations with which it is easier for small business owners to
comply.191 Some of the complaints about taxation, however, while initially
well founded, turn out be efforts at incumbency protection. When Airbnb
tried to enter into an agreement with New York to collect occupancy taxes,
the hotel industry, which had objected to tax avoidance by Airbnb providers,
then tried to prevent the agreement for fear that that these agreements
would give Airbnb legitimacy.192
C.

Protecting Against New Threats

A final kind of regulation seeks to protect against new threats that the
sharing economy is supposed to pose. New threats may indeed demand new
regulation, but many of the proposed regulations would cramp the sharing
economy, including its equalizing features, without delivering substantial
benefits.
For instance, the equalizing effects of the sharing economy should also
make us hesitant to expand consumer protection law to apply new requirements to the sharing economy. Of course, consumer protection law should
apply to false advertising and other instances of fraud as much as it does
anywhere else. But Ryan Calo and Alex Rosenblat want to retool such laws to
189 Laura Saunders, The Blind Spot in a Sharing Economy: Tax Collection, WALL ST. J. (May
19, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-blind-spot-in-a-sharing-economy-tax-collec
tion-1495186206.
190 Id.
191 See Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1415
(2018).
192 Alison Griswold, Why Airbnb Desperately Wants to Pay Hotel Taxes, SLATE (Feb. 13,
2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2015/02/airbnb_hotel_taxes_
why_does_the_sharing_economy_startup_want_to_pay_them.html.
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attack practices in the sharing economy that are not fraudulent or otherwise
in violation of current law.193
First, some of their complaints about specific practices, which they claim
are manipulative, should be rejected, because the practices are either needed
to make the sharing economy work or are trivial. For instance, they observe
that Uber (and presumably other ridesharing firms) uses its technology to
effectively require drivers to pick up all rides without allowing them to
choose whom to pick up.194 But this requirement makes the market more
reliable and beneficial for consumers who can be more confident of getting a
ride—the very thing that makes Uber attractive and equalizing. Indeed, public regulation legally imposes the same requirement on taxis.195 They also
complain that Uber uses an algorithm to make prices seem attractive to consumers, which they themselves admit is like lot retailers pricing a product for
$9.99.196 If the government does not punish such trivial conduct in the latter
case, it should certainly not investigate algorithms for that reason.
More generally, they believe the government should fund researchers to
look into the practices of ridesharing companies, even if their practices have
not been found to be illegal.197 This kind of outsourcing of research creates
bad incentives, because those who do not like the sharing economy, including incumbents in the same business space, are the ones most attracted to
investigating it, giving reason to doubt their findings. For good reason, we
do not generally fund volunteers to do the work of law enforcement. Finally,
they are sympathetic to punishing behavior even if it is not deceptive, so long
as the conduct “involve[s] using information about a consumer against her
or introducing other material or structural disadvantages.”198 But retailers
even in the nonsharing economy do this all the time, as when they decide to
offer discounts to some but not to others based on their past purchasing
practices. Furthermore, a sharing economy company will have trouble figuring out ex ante what is prohibited by such a vague prohibition.199 As a result,
that selective invigoration of consumer protection law means we will get less
sharing and innovation, and thus fewer equalizing effects.
Another concern is the sharing economy’s new threats to third parties—
citizens who are neither sellers nor consumers in the sharing economy but
193 See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 5, at 1623.
194 Id. at 1661.
195 See Speta, supra note 81, at 109.
196 Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 5, at 1658.
197 Id. at 1684.
198 Id. at 1687–88.
199 Calo and Rosenblat argue that this move will not have bad effects, because it will just
involve “line-drawing,” but they do not offer any substantial lines to make concrete the
rather opaque standard of a prohibition against “using information about a consumer
against her or introducing other material or structural disadvantages.” Id. And line drawing is particularly unlikely to give future guidance in an industry which is likely to change
quickly because of technology.
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who are indirectly affected by the transactions of others.200 While these regulations are never presented as attempts to protect incumbent businesses
against competition, that is often their practical effect and possibly even their
true intent. A prime example was the effort of New York City Mayor Bill de
Blasio to cap the number of rides Uber and other ridesharing companies
could offer in the city.201 The justification was that limiting ridesharing
would relieve congestion in the city.202 But this policy singles out ridesharing companies for discrimination. When used for individual rides, the
ridesharing vehicles cause no more congestion than taxis. In fact,
uberPOOL and Lyft Line may reduce congestion, because one car is carrying
more than one passenger.203
Undaunted by the battle over this ride-cap regulation, regulators in New
York City even more recently proposed regulations that would impose on
ridesharing companies like Uber and Lyft a minimum earnings requirement
of $17.22 per hour, such that if a driver’s weekly earnings were less than this
amount, the companies would be forced to make up the difference.204
Though a minimum earnings requirement is not synonymous with a minimum wage requirement, the negative effects are similar: increasing the price
of rides, driving down employment in ridesharing, and, ultimately, reducing
choice for consumers, who would be forced to take less preferred means of
transportation.
New York City’s proposed minimum earnings requirement epitomizes
the faulty assumption upon which many potential regulations of the sharing
economy rest—namely, that jobs in the sharing economy, like driving for
Uber or renting out a property through Airbnb, are no different than other
jobs with fixed hours and work arrangements, such as working in a restaurant
or retail industries. These regulations ignore the tremendous flexibility
afforded by jobs in the sharing economy. Setting one’s own hours can be
significantly beneficial because it allows individuals to pursue other work and
interests, address personal issues or limitations, and generally maximize the
efficiency with which they go about contributing to society.
Regulators ignore these nonmonetary benefits of the sharing economy
at the risk of great detriment to those the regulations are ostensibly designed
to help. That is so frequently the case with many of the states’ regulatory
concoctions: the stated intentions of these schemes are to, among others,
200 See Edelman & Geradin, supra note 159, at 309 (“An important set of legal interventions seeks to address circumstances in which companies impact noncustomers and the
public at large.”).
201 Jared Meyer, Uber’s New York Win, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/jaredmeyer/2016/01/19/uber-deblasio-new-york-study/#190f80983924.
202 See id.
203 Cf. Stephen R. Miller, Decentralized, Disruptive, and On Demand: Opportunities for Local
Government in the Sharing Economy, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 47, 49 (2016) (noting
that the adoption of uberPOOL could “assist with environmental emissions compliance”).
204 Emma G. Fitzsimmons & Noam Scheiber, New York City Considers New Pay Rules for
Uber Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2018), htps://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/nyregion/
uber-drivers-pay-nyc.html.
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protect the vulnerable from being taken advantage of, but they often leave us
all worse off.
Airbnb is even a more frequent target of legislation ostensibly designed
to protect third parties. Legislatures in places as diverse as New York City and
Asheville, North Carolina, have tried to prohibit property owners from renting out their homes for short durations.205 The justifications for these
prohibitions are varied. First, supporters of such legislation argue that transient renters disrupt the peace and quiet of a neighborhood.206 Of course,
travelers do the same at hotels, but the legislation never applies to hotels.
More focused legislation has attempted to restrict Airbnb in areas that are
zoned for residential housing on the theory that the Airbnb hosts are using
their property commercially.207 But even here it is doubtful that property
owners renting out their houses to a limited number of occupants are causing any more disruption than their neighbors who have guests and parties.208
A solution to any incremental rise in disturbances from Airbnb rentals that is
more consistent with preserving its equalizing effects would be to more
strictly enforce existing regulations against littering and excessive noise.209
Much of the legislation against Airbnb has come in cities like San Francisco210 and New York,211 which are dominated by cooperatives, condominiums, and rental apartments.212 In those cities, the government legislation
restricting Airbnb because of potential disturbance to neighbors is even less
justified because the neighbors most likely to be disturbed by short-term rentals can use co-op, condominium, and rental rules to prevent that activity in
205 Sarah Griffiths, Where Home Meets Hotel: Regulating Tourist Accommodations in
the Age of Airbnb 23, 44 (March 10, 2017) (unpublished MPP thesis, Simon Fraser University), http://summit.sfu.ca/item/17183.
206 See id. at 1–2 (noting how some concerns over short-term rentals are “complaints
over quality of life impacts brought by the increased presence of transient communities in
residential neighbourhoods”).
207 See id. at 1.
208 See Alexander W. Cloonan, Comment, The New American Home: A Look at the Legal
Issues Surrounding Airbnb and Short-Term Rentals, 42 U. DAYTON L. REV. 27, 43 (2017) (citing
Ngai Pindell, Home Sweet Home? The Efficacy of Rental Restrictions to Promote Neighborhood Stability, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 41, 55 (2009)).
209 See Pindell, supra note 208, at 55 (“In striking down [short-term rental] regulations,
courts have encouraged municipalities to use other measures—such as definitions of family or increased enforcement of nuisance codes—to mitigate the impact of potentially disruptive, short-term renters on a community.”).
210 See Interian, supra note 141, at 146.
211 See Roberta A. Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, Airbnb: A Case Study in Occupancy Regulation and Taxation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 103, 107–08 (2015).
212 See Interian, supra note 141, at 149 (“The situation in New York is unique, however,
because the city has a high number of strict co-ops . . . in areas of high rent.” (citing Press
Release, Liz Krueger, Senator, N.Y. State Senate, Statement on Airbnb Subpoena Agreement (May 21, 2014), http://www.nysenate.gov/press-release/statement-airbnb-subpoenaagreement)).
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their buildings.213 That kind of private ordering at the building level is
much more likely to accurately gauge the costs and benefits of permitting
short-term rentals than is municipal legislation, because hotel owners will not
have as much influence in shaping the rules established by individual
buildings.214
Indeed, the sharing economy naturally creates markets to address these
conflicts, mediating between the different stakeholders in an apartment
building and making short-term rentals easier and less disruptive. Pillow Residential, for instance, provides contracts with building management and renters to permit short-term subleases.215 These agreements specify the number
of nights available for rentals and provide mechanisms for monitoring compliance with rules.216 Both management and owners get part of the revenue
earned through such rentals.217 This is another example of how the sharing
economy solves the problem of agency costs: a new kind of agent, made possible by the information age, facilitates an agreement that makes both owner
and long-time renters better off.
Another justification for legislation restricting Airbnb is that those rentals raise the costs of housing for local residents by bidding up the price of
housing. Analyzing these regulations under an equality framework requires
distinguishing between those that restrict the operation of owner-occupied
homes and larger commercial enterprises. Both use sites like Airbnb, but it is
owner-occupied homes that create more equality for those owning a home,
although both may contribute to equality for travelers by reducing prices for
short-term rentals in high-priced locations.
Restricting the ability of owners to rent out their apartments is hard to
justify under the idea of making housing more affordable. First, this supply is
not likely to be available but for services like Airbnb. Thus, not surprisingly,
the empirical work that has been done suggests that permitting owner-occupied housing to list rental space for short-term allotments has relatively little
effect on home prices.218 Moreover, an equality perspective on Airbnb
reminds us that its services should help affordability in an important respect:
213 See Kevin Davis, Guest Wrong, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2014, at 19–20 (noting that Airbnb “is
careful to inform its users that they’re responsible for . . . conferring with condo and co-op
boards” before renting through Airbnb).
214 Cf. Pindell, supra note 208, at 59 (“Developers, in turn, can design a community
without conforming to standardized requirements ill-suited to a planned community.
Moreover, future residents of these communities benefit because negotiation often results
in more thoughtful inclusion and placement of amenities than does the application of a
rigid standardized zoning and development code.”).
215 PILLOW, https://www.pillow.com/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
216 Id.; see also Ryan Lawler, With $13.5M in New Funds, Pillow Partners with Building
Owners to Make Rentals Airbnb-Friendly, TECHCRUNCH (June 21, 2017), https://techcrunch
.com/2017/06/21/pillow-residential-13-5-million/ (describing this new focus on Pillow
Residential).
217 Id.
218 See Lisa Ward, This Is How Much Airbnb Is Driving Up Home Prices and Rents, WALL ST.
J.: MARKETWATCH (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-is-how-much-
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in a well-functioning market, the opportunity for short-term rentals should
actually lower the effective cost of housing for those renting out their home
on occasion. Those who are financially constrained can now use their property to take in short-term renters on occasion, defraying their housing
expense.
The effect of housing listed by those who do not occupy it is more complicated. Researchers have suggested that easier access to listing commercial
housing on Airbnb drives up the price of housing, no doubt because owners
can get more money for some properties by short-term rentals than by longterm ones.219 But it is not clear that in the long run, as opposed to the short
run, such rentals will increase the cost of housing. By giving owners the
opportunity to switch from long-term rentals to short-term rentals depending
on circumstances, it will provide developers with greater incentives to build
new housing, which will increase the supply of housing in a given area. Basic
principles of economics make this self-evident: developers will want to build
more houses because Airbnb makes them more valuable to the owner.
Another way of putting this is that many owners will now be able more easily
to rent out their homes or portions of their homes. This added source of
income effectively makes homes more affordable and thus effectively cuts
their price.
It is true that existing zoning laws may prove to be an obstacle to building more housing units in cities like San Francisco and New York in the long
run. Regulation can prevent supply from meeting new demand. But in that
case, an approach more consistent with promoting equality is not to restrict
Airbnb, but instead to relax existing zoning laws. Numerous studies have
shown that it is restrictive zoning regulations that drive up the price of housing, making housing in such cities unaffordable to the middle class.220
All of these regulations ignore the advantages of permitting easier shortterm rentals by those who want to visit rather than live in a jurisdiction.
Increasing the ability to travel widely and affordably is one of the best ways to
equalize the life experiences of the rich and the rest of society. How to weigh
these advantages against any higher housing costs for those who want to live
in the jurisdiction is a difficult question. But these advantages need to be
considered in any evaluation of whether restricting the sharing economy in
housing contributes to the equality of material condition.

airbnb-is-driving-up-home-prices-and-rents-2017-10-31 (describing new research into the
effect of Airbnb on housing prices).
219 Id.
220 See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Zoning on Housing
Affordability (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8835, 2002), http://www
.nber.org/papers/w8835.
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SHARING

The sharing economy has more general implications for the debate over
inequality. It shows that the dematerialization of the world brought on by
information technology creates important equalizers between the wealthy
and most of the rest of society. First, even were we only interested in income,
the sharing economy shows how technology can make that hard to calculate
by changing the structure of work. The sharing economy can outrun taxation and thus make it hard for government to measure unreported
income.221
But more importantly, income is only a proxy for material inequality. In
fact, what we are most interested in is total utility from work together with
consumption. The sharing economy creates good conditions of employment
for people that may not have had that before. Driving for a ridesharing service is more flexible than a limousine service and safer than taxis.222 And
while the changes made by the sharing economy can dramatically improve
the utility from work, it seems very likely that working conditions outside the
sharing economy are generally improving. Millions of people telecommute,
a working condition that gives valuable flexibility and avoids the monetary
costs and physical hassles of commuting as well as a better balance of work
and family life.223 Tens of millions of people today, for instance, have access
to a computer at work of which they also utilize for personal use. That too is
a valuable kind of flexibility, previously available to the well-off through control over their time or access to secretaries. A world where the conditions of
work are converging among income classes is a more equal world, even if that
equality is not reflected in income.
Finally, the consumption created by the sharing economy redounds particularly to those who are not rich. They can now summon quality rides from
the comfort of their homes and gain access to meals and housing in the
center of places they would love to be. Who is enjoying the consumer surplus
of the new economy is yet another issue that is needed to evaluate equality.
To provide another example of the consumption of the new economy, it is
almost impossible to count all the free goods that people enjoy today. But
one can begin with the free good that connects more than a billion people
and is also an example of the sharing economy more broadly considered,
because an intermediary connects people virtually. The average time people
spend on Facebook is fifty minutes per day.224 That comes to a total of 304
hours per year. To estimate that consumption, let us assume that it is worth a
modest value close to the minimum wage of ten dollars per hour or at about
221 See supra notes 190–92 and accompanying text.
222 See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text.
223 Edward E. Potter, Telecommuting: The Future of Work, Corporate Culture, and American
Society, 24 J. LAB. RES. 73, 79 (2003).
224 James B. Stewart, Facebook Has 50 Minutes of Your Time Each Day. It Wants More., N.Y.
TIMES (May 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/business/facebook-bendsthe-rules-of-audience-engagement-to-its-advantage.html.
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3000 dollars over what they could otherwise do with their time.225 Given that
the cost is free, these are equalizing dollars, available to the rich and those of
modest means.
It might be objected that Facebook is not really free. To get access, we
give up personal data that is valuable to Facebook since they can steer advertisers to us. First, the data is not worth much, if anything at all, until it is
aggregated. Facebook is creating value of something that without its own or
similar technology would be close to worthless, just as Airbnb is creating
value by pooling information about properties. But let us assume that the
data could be sold in an individuated market. Its value then cuts in favor of
the even greater equalizing force of Facebook. In general, the wealthier a
user, the more valuable is his or her data.226 Thus, if we are to calculate the
net benefits from Facebook, those of modest means are getting a substantially greater boost than the wealthy.
It is hard to dismiss these issues as anomalies of the sharing economy,
because recognizing the advantages to the nonrich of the sharing economy
immediately calls to mind other examples. That is not surprising, because
the same dematerialization that permits segmentation of property and reduction of agency costs is going on elsewhere. It is that fundamental trend that
is responsible for phenomenon as disparate as telecommuting and Facebook.
Only by understanding how the fundamental change created by the information society is affecting the material conditions of life can we hope to gauge
the direction of the material conditions of equality.
CONCLUSION
The entrepreneurial sharing economy is a force for equalizing life
experiences, broadly reflecting the capacity of innovative technologies to
dematerialize the economy by facilitating electronic transactions. Because
these economic connections are so inexpensive, they help the middle class
more than wealthy individuals. For middle-class consumers, the sharing
economy creates deeper and more liquid markets and reduces prices by
increasing the available supply of goods and services. Through the use of
online agents, collaborative platforms can elevate the experiences of the average consumer closer to the experiences of the wealthy who have their own
agents, like chauffeurs and cooks. The sharing economy democratizes the
ability of consumers to have distinctive experiences, like renting properties
225 Cf. Tim Worstall, Facebook Doesn’t Waste Trillions in Time: That’s the Value Facebook Adds
for Us, FORBES (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2016/02/04/face
book-doesnt-waste-trillions-in-time-thats-the-value-facebook-adds-for-us/#3657d4a06d57
(suggesting that total consumption value of Facebook is $900 billion); see also Austan Goolsbee & Peter J. Klenow, Valuing Consumer Products by the Time Spent Using Them: An Application to the Internet (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11995, 2006), http:/
/www.nber.org/papers/w11995 (using wage to calculate value of time spent on internet).
226 Gianclaudio Malgieri & Bart Custers, Pricing Privacy—The Right to Know the Value of
Your Personal Data, 34 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 289, 291 (2018).
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through Airbnb in unique surroundings or enjoying the company of tour
guides in distant locations tailored to their particular interests.
The peer production economy also provides new sources of income for
providers that are predominantly enjoyed by the middle class, because people of modest means are now able to easily rent out their real and personal
property. The emerging sharing economy also provides new kinds of jobs
that have the flexibility and autonomy that workers greatly value. The most
important way to promote equality in this area is to prevent burdensome
regulation from slowing down the equalizing dynamic of the sharing
economy.
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